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Summary 
We present here the proceedings of the 5th seminar on emerging infectious diseases 
(EIDs), held in Paris on March 22nd, 2016, with seven  priority proposals that can be 
outlined as follows: 
 Encourage research on the prediction, screening and early detection of new risks 
of infection 
 Develop research and surveillance concerning transmission of pathogens between 
animals and humans, with their reinforcement in particular in intertropical areas 
(« hot-spots ») thanks to public support 
 Pursue aid development and support in these areas of prevention and training for 
local health personnel, and to foster risk awareness in the population 
 Ensure adapted patient care in order to promote adherence to treatment and to 
epidemic propagation reduction measures 
 Develop greater sensitization and training among politicians and healthcare 
providers, in order to better prepare them to respond to new types of crises 
 Modify the logic of governance, drawing from all available modes of 
communication and incorporating new information-sharing tools 
 Develop economic research on the fight against EIDs, taking into account specific 
driving factors in order to create a balance between preventive and treatment 
approaches. 
Keywords 
Emerging infectious disease, ecology, microbiology, OneHealth, health crisis, 
development aid strategy and policy 
Résumé 
Nous présentons ici les actes du 5e séminaire maladies infectieuses émergentes (MIE), qui 
s’est tenu le 22 mars 2016 à Paris. Les sept propositions prioritaires issues de ce 
séminaire sont les suivantes : 
 Encourager la recherche sur la prévision, le dépistage et la détection précoces des 
nouveaux risques infectieux 
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 Développer la recherche et la surveillance sur la transmission des agents infectieux 
entre l’animal et l’humain, en les renforçant, en particulier dans les zones 
intertropicales, « points chauds » (« hotspots ») pour le risque infectieux, grâce à 
des aides publiques 
 Poursuivre, dans ces zones, le développement et le soutien des actions de 
prévention et de formation des acteurs de santé locaux et favoriser la culture du 
risque dans les populations 
 Prendre en charge les patients de façon adaptée afin de favoriser l'adhésion aux 
soins et aux mesures visant à réduire la diffusion d'une épidémie  
 Développer la sensibilisation et l’entraînement des acteurs politiques et sanitaires, 
afin de mieux les préparer à la réponse aux crises de typologie nouvelle 
 Réviser les logiques de gouvernance en s’appuyant sur tous les modes de 
communication disponibles, intégrant les nouveaux outils d’information 
collaborative 
 Développer les recherches économiques sur la lutte contre les MIE, tenant compte 
des déterminants spécifiques afin d’équilibrer les démarches préventives et 
curatives 
Mots-clés 
Maladies infectieuses émergentes, écologie, microbiologie, une seule santé, crise 
sanitaire, stratégies et politiques d’aide au développement 
Page 5 sur 27 
Manuscript 
1. Introduction 
The objectives of the 5th edition of the Val de Grace School’s seminar were to take 
a global, integrative approach to the emergence of new infectious disease agents, putting 
these in perspective relative to other types of risk, as well as studying crisis situations and 
the breaches brought on by the occurrence of emerging infectious diseases (EIDs). Two 
key conferences respectively opened and closed this annual seminar; the first was given 
by Dr. Peter Daszak (President of the EcoHealth Alliance and program director of USAID-
EPT-PREDICT), the second by Dr. Patrick Lagadec (former research professor at the Ecole 
Polytechnique, Palaiseau).  
Planned for an anticipated up to 200 participants, this seminar is designed for decision-
makers, experts, medical doctors and scientists interested in human and animal health, 
social sciences, environmental sciences, prospective analysis, biosecurity and defense. 
This day of presentations and debates is presented under the auspices of the French 
Social Affairs and Health Ministries, as well as that of the Environment, Energy and 
Marine Affairs. It is organized in the framework of a multiple partnership with ANSES (the 
French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health & Safety), the Health 
Chair of Sciences-Po, the EVDG (Val de Grace School) from the Armed Services Health 
Division (SSA), the School for Advanced Studies in Public Health (EHESP), the High Council 
for Public Health (HCSP), the Pasteur Institute of Paris, the French National Research 
Institute for Sustainable Development (IRD), the Thematic Multi-organisms and Public 
Health Institutes (ITMOs) - Immunology, Inflammation, Infectiology and Microbiology 
Institute (I3M) and Public Health Institute (ISP) from the National Alliance for Life Sciences 
and Health (AVIESAN), the French Microbiology Society (SFM), the French Infectious 
Diseases Society (SPILF), the Paris - Diderot University and the BioMérieux Foundation. 
2. Current issues: presentations and debates 
2.1 Keynote conference - Understanding the ecology and economy of pandemics 
Speaker: Peter Daszak (The EcoHealth Alliance) 
Moderator: Jean-François Guégan (IRD) 
Peter Daszak remarks today can be summed up in two primary messages, both 
personal and that of scientists from the EcoHealth Alliance. First, we must increase our 
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research capabilities in order to understand the direct and less-direct causes of emerging 
infections if we hope to fight them once they become responsible for epidemics or 
pandemics. Secondly, this presentation was illustrated with a few projects concerning the 
economics of EIDs which reveal the extraordinary costs they incur for national economies. 
There is at least one obvious reason to speak of this, which is that politicians and public 
decision-makers are in fact quite sensitized when the economic damage engendered by 
the latest epidemics and pandemics are explained to them. If one takes, for example, the 
SARS-Cov pandemic, it led to a 1 to 2% decrease in gross domestic product in several 
Southeast Asian countries, for an estimated overall cost of 30 to 50 billion US dollars, 
relative to the total number of approximately 800 people worldwide who were affected. 
The appearance of new EIDs appears both more frequent and also vaster in terms of 
number of people affected these last years, many of these diseases appearing in 
developing or low-income countries. Taking the case of the Ebola virus (EBOV) epidemic 
which broke out in West Africa in 2014, it was much more widespread than any other 
epidemic to ever occur in Central Africa (400 people affected during an epidemic). It is 
very difficult in the United States – where Peter Daszak is working – to get public decision-
makers interested, as is true with the population which feels very distant from such 
problems. EcoHealth Alliance has tried to draw the media and the public’s attention to it, 
in vain! They only received one single email from the management of the Boston airport, 
informing us that our work on the risk of Ebola virus propagation via transcontinental air 
transport was unfounded and that the Boston airport couldn’t experience this type of 
threat. About a month later, when an American citizen was repatriated for treatment, the 
public began to panic; the media, particularly the TV channel CNN, exaggerated in 
broadcasting the issue, and the government took several decisions, notably regarding 
assistance and monitoring of international airports. These measures were decided upon 
no scientific basis in a moment of panic, and it seems that with every new worrisome EID, 
it’s the same story! The measures taken are often disproportionate to the seriousness of 
the phenomenon. Human demography has exploded in recent years, and populations 
today are concentrated in megalopolises. This tendency is even more marked in tropical 
areas in the South where there is also an important biodiversity of animal species. 
Therefore, there exist today more opportunities for a virus or bacteria to pass from an 
animal to a human, then to propagate among the human population. International air 
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transport makes possible the spread of these new infectious risks on a vast scale. What 
are governments doing faced with this type of threat when the demands on the part of 
the population are ever-increasing? Vaccines are also considered by the former as a 
weapon of total destruction, and by the public as a widely-available miracle tool. Neither 
is truly aware that it takes an average of 10 years to produce a vaccine. Also is it the right 
strategy in that it banks more on cure than on anticipation? In the U.S., President Obama 
opted for a development aid policy through USAID favoring training and improvement of 
human and technical capacities to prevent future EIDs in the most needy countries. The 
American Congress, however, did not follow this path, instead directing funds allocated to 
USAID towards research on a vaccine for and on epidemic management of the Ebola virus 
crisis. 
 
Recently, in collaboration with economists, EcoHealth Alliance modeled the risk of 
a new emergence in a situation identical to that of Ebola in 2014-15 in West Africa, 
estimating the economic damage caused, and attempted to deduce the economic cost of 
a health policy based on epidemic management as opposed to one favoring prevention 
and training. According to their estimates, a budget of 5 billion US dollars seems to suffice 
to prevent a new epidemic in West Africa in opting for the second solution. Their 
simulations obviously include many underlying hypotheses. All the same, this analysis 
indicates that if we were to quickly make available 1 billion of the 5 billion dollars for the 
purchase of equipment, the setting up of working laboratories on site, field hospitals, 
sending doctors and nurses to the area, training of our partners in affected countries - as 
military medical services know how to do - such a strategy would represent a real capital 
investment in managing epidemic propagation. Unfortunately this was not the option 
chosen by U.S. current governments, which we can only regret. 
 
Now let’s discuss the ecology of Ebola virus transmission. The bat species Pteropus 
are possibly the host reservoirs of Ebola virus. As for the Marburg fever virus we are now 
certain that these bats are in fact the reservoir. The Ebola virus is clearly present in a few 
giant bat species in Africa. It can also circulate among primate species or indirectly 
through other infected mammals. We also know which species of bats are affected or not. 
Even if the reservoir question is still under debate, we know a great deal about the 
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rainforest circulation of this virus and the circumstances of its spreading in the human 
population with high-risk groups such as hunters. Based on this, is it possible to prevent 
the virus’ transmission to humans? Although it poses a complex question it is nonetheless 
possible to offer some avenues of reflection. William Karesh, vice-president of EcoHealth 
Alliance and instigator of the OneHealth concept, carried out a research project in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, which consisted in educating villagers, and particularly 
hunters, regarding the danger of recovering primate corpses from the forest. This 
program was a real success, as the villagers changed their behavior and the eating of 
monkey meat. This represents a low-cost prevention approach, which in the end 
functions well if properly implemented. The only real solution when faced with this type 
of health threat is to work in conjunction with populations, and to treat questions of 
poverty, equality, and use and transformation of land together. These are arduous and 
complex tasks which must be carried out over the long term. This type of message is 
extremely difficult to make heard among politicians and the public, and obviously more 
complex that announcing or clamoring for a vaccine. 
 
We are faced with primordial questions which are more or less difficult to answer. 
Are we witnessing an increased frequency of EIDs appearance? Are there more cases 
today? Can we predict patterns, or rules, of emergence? Are there geographic areas in 
which these emerging infections are more frequently or widely observed today? Do we 
possess the scientific ability to predict exactly where the next infectious epidemic will 
start? Evidently, if we were so able we might allocate the financial resources and 
technical and scientific support to suspected areas. At the moment we do just the 
opposite, or we do nothing, and we are disconcerted at each new emergence. In order to 
convince governing bodies and public decision-makers, we must demonstrate to them 
that predictive approaches are less costly than curative ones. Using approaches inherited 
from ecology and biogeography EcoHealth Alliance has adapted the same principles to 
understanding the ecology and spatial distribution of EID principles observed over the last 
decades. Their work shows that of the nearly 400 new EIDs which have appeared, the so-
called zoonotic ones originating in wild animals have been in net increase in the last 40 
years; 3 out of 5 new infections which appear each year originate in wild fauna. What’s 
more, the risk of infectious transmission is highly and doubly correlated with human 
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density, as are these diseases of animal origin to the areas’ biodiversity. They called these 
areas “hot-spots” for disease risks, mostly situated in intertropical regions. They are 
advocating for these specific zones to be those on which they concentrate our research 
efforts as well as international public aid for development. In fact, it is not only biological 
diversity in animals which must be taken into account, but also the evolution of natural 
ecosystems and their disappearance over recent years. Deforestation and land use 
changes by populations are driving forces in the appearance in new EIDs. Therefore, 
international politicians must better link economic strategies to those of habitat and 
biodiversity coordination if we wish to avoid new pandemics. 
 
In further use of the formalism of economic models, they have shown that a stable 
political strategy appears once joint simulations were conducted on economic damage 
due to a pandemic health crisis and preventive decision-making. Even though the 
financial cost of preventive strategies may initially appear great, an optimal solution 
based on prevention shows itself over the mid- and long-term to be finally less costly than 
cure and control-focused strategies. We have need on an international level for the 
equivalent of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which, in the same 
way as does the IPCC on climate change scenarios and their impact, would concentrate on 
EIDs and their sociopolitical, economic and environmental consequences. The American 
development aid agency USAID did not originally give priority to EIDs, but the different 
public health crises brought on by the H5N1 bird flu virus in recent years have led USAID 
to modify their strategic orientation, notably with regard to the economic weight they 
bring to bear on regional economies. The fact that these epidemics appear first in 
countries situated in strongly species-rich intertropical areas which are developing or low-
income, requires a reconsideration of our Western policies on development aid in order 
to better include these notions. For ten years USAID funded a program on new emerging 
infection threats, for a total of 1.3 billion U.S dollars. At EcoHealth Alliance we have 
collaborated with this initiative through participation in the PREDICT research project 
with funding of 45 to 50 million dollars. The goal of the PREDICT program was to identify 
microorganisms potentially pathogenic for human populations, and which are hosted in 
animal reservoirs. We took particular interest in three animal groups, not only because it 
was impossible to work on all the animal groups present, but also because the three 
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groups we chose - primates, rodents and bats - were recognized as being major reservoirs 
of agents which are pathogenic for humans. These three groups alone make up 75% of 
the world’s mammal species. Within the PREDICT program we applied our knowledge of 
the high-risk emergence zones to draw samples from a large cohort of these three animal 
groups. Over the first five years of the program we sampled 56,000 animals, trained 2,500 
scientists and medical and administrative personnel, and discovered more than 1,000 
new viruses belonging to families of viruses known not to be infectious to humans. This in 
itself represents a major finding! Obviously the discovery of a microorganism does not in 
and of itself indicates that a new EID might appear. Their work in Mexico on bat species 
demonstrated the existence of a dozen viruses which are very like the MERS-CoV 
responsible for the respiratory syndrome in the Middle East. They therefore believe that 
the MERS-CoV is not hosted by dromedaries but rather by bats, as they found it in our 
work in Mexico. Some of these new Coronaviruses may potentially be pathological for 
humans. It is clearly impossible to identify all viruses present on the planet. It would also 
be necessary to do the same for bacteria, parasitic fungi, and protozoa. As they are 
innumerable, it is preferable to make strategic choices regarding microorganism research 
and that on the highest-risk animal groups. Based on our knowledge of currently known 
viruses in Bangladesh bats, they extrapolated this data using species curve rarefaction, 
and capture-recapture techniques well known to ecologists, to estimate the total number 
of viruses to be expected in the totality of known mammal species in the world. They 
reached a value of 320,000 new viruses which remain to be discovered. Were we to carry 
out biodiscovery research on these viruses, one could catalogue them, classify them in 
relation to already-known viruses, in particular those known to be pathogenic to humans, 
and through comparative genome studies assess their pathogenic potential. We are 
currently in the second phase of the US PREDICT program, with an important accent on 
our manner of working. In fact we are currently concentrating more on factors involved in 
emergence and seek particularly to understand three such factors: habitat change and 
use, intensive agriculture, and the commerce of biodiversity. US development aid policy 
also focuses on three strategic areas: North Africa, West Africa, and continued research 
activity in Saudi Arabia. These geographic choices are shaped by recent events around the 
MERS-CoV and Ebola viruses. Especially in the case of MERS-CoV, dromedaries are 
certainly involved in the transmission cycle of the virus, but we believe that its true 
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reservoir is the bat. Thus using the many data at our disposal we were able to show that 
the infectious risk of MERS-CoV for humans is not great in Saudi Arabia, but it is in other 
areas of contact between bat, dromedary and human populations, particularly in the horn 
of Africa, especially in Somalia. Somalia is currently a politically disjointed country, where 
public health surveillance and care are greatly lacking or simply non-existent. For example 
it is currently impossible to state how many MERS-CoV cases there are in Somalia, or how 
many might exist. Our scientific objectives are therefore to better understand the 
behaviors at the junction of wild or domestic fauna and human populations. 
For example, understanding human behaviors and practices at the interface of tropical 
forests and villages could help us to interpret how zoonotic transmission happens. 
Through acting upon these behaviors and habits we could lower this type of emerging 
risk. Currently EcoHealth Alliance has research sites in Uganda, Malaysia and Brazil; they 
are investigating the role played by habitat changes such as deforestation, human 
interaction with biodiversity through behavior and use. In Manaus in Brazil for example, 
the maximum risk of new infection is not in the heart of the city where the major markets 
are located, but in the peri-urban areas where agriculture and ranching are developing. 
These zones which ecologists call « ecotones », or transition zones, are located near 
strongly species-rich regions, with high concentrations of livestock which can come into 
contact with wild fauna, and which are furthermore inhabited by ranchers and farmers. 
These regions which are now located everywhere in the intertropical world for the 
purpose of feeding urban populations, are generally those where new infections appear, 
and where future pandemics will also most likely appear. At the heart of this research is 
the priority of understanding behaviors, habits and practices of populations with the goal 
of changing these factors. This is a long-term endeavor which requires developing 
approaches in the field for communicating with local populations, and for developing 
community participation in our own research, which we also consider an excellent means 
of education. 
 
2.2 (Re)-Thinking public health risks: the lessons to be learned from sociological studies 
on technological risks about infectious risks 
Moderators: Henri Bergeron (Chaire Santé de Sciences Po), Jocelyn Raude (EHESP, IRD) 
2.2.1 Risks and the limits of the State 
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Presenter: Olivier Borraz (CNRS, Sciences Po) 
O. Borraz recalled the fact that we live in a society of risk. It is not that the dangers 
surrounding us are more numerous or more fearsome than before, but simply that the 
notion of risk plays a central role in public policies, in public and private organizational 
management, and in the controversies around new technologies. Genetically modified 
organisms, mobile phones, nuclear waste, urban sanitation sludge; the activities now 
considered health or environmental risks are countless. This categorization puts public 
authorities in a position of having to ensure the safety of populations, even as the State 
itself sometimes represents a risk factor. It is therefore essential to understand how an 
activity becomes a risk, and how it is then managed by public authorities as well as by 
companies, associations and local conglomerates. Risk from its identification to its 
management, from its highlighting to its instrumentalization becomes a tool linked to the 
emergence and expansion of a welfare state. It is used by politicians to justify on the one 
hand its lack of involvement in risk management, on the other the seizing of power over 
sectors from which they had previously disengaged. This political power seizure plays on 
politicians’ selective dissemination within society of risk identification and the knowledge 
required for its management.  
 
Two different processes exist by which risk represents an organizing principle for 
political power, a means to assist and contribute to the definition of the State’s limits: 
« putting at risk » and « regulation through risk ».  
« Putting at risk » refers to all processes by which an event is described as or constitutes a 
real or predicted danger, and which thus is categorized as a risk [1]. There are many 
events, objects, and situations which have historically been categorized as « putting at 
risk » and which can be studied by sociologists (illness, divorce, food crises, 
unemployment, nuclear risk, chemical substances, technological risks …). This putting at 
risk can be a product of the State or of interest groups, under the influence of lobbying. 
This has been part of the organization of modern societies since the 20th century, and in 
particular following World War II with the expansion of the welfare state which took 
advantage of different factors putting the population at risk in order to enlarge its sphere 
of activity and thus its power in the name of a protective mission. This welfare state built 
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itself around risk management in creating and organizing agencies, action plans, drills, 
and monitoring mechanisms for their application through nationwide inspection bodies. 
The promotion of « risk instruments » and a « risk-based regulation » approach makes it 
possible to deal with risk-creating events. For the last two decades, in a context of 
decreasing means and in reaction to public-health crises which have led, according to 
some, to an overprotective state, a new tendency has emerged of governments using 
« risk instruments » to better allocate means and to decrease the State’s hold. Despite 
their differences these two approaches are to the same end, which is to define - or 
perpetually re-define - the limits of the State. « Risk instruments » contribute in each 
« putting at risk » situation to determining the State’s involvement, the reason for its 
having competencies and resources, and therefore also the State’s limits as opposed to 
that which concerns the private sector and individuals. The outcome of this defining as 
« putting at risk » and of the application of these risk instruments may be used by the 
State either to invest, or to disinvest; in the latter case for example entrusting risk 
management which formerly would have been the realm of institutions to local or private 
agents or to individuals. 
In the same way, risk instruments (or risk-based regulation or using risks to 
rationalize public intervention) may lead to State disinvestment or, on the contrary, be 
used by the State to seize back the reins in certain areas. Paradoxically risk instruments 
serve in this instance to re-centralize or to « remote-control » areas to which the State 
had granted greater autonomy (universities or hospitals, for example). 
Thus the way in which Western societies manage risk, and the way in which these risks - 
their identification, how politicians and individuals perceive them, and their management 
- transform the links between the State (the political powers-that-be) and civil society are 
important to understand for those faced with risk management, especially in public-
health risk management. What consequences these risk technologies have from one 
country to another thus greatly depends on institutions, State structure, professional 
organizations and their interrelationships, the balance of power and the forces involved, 
and the legal structure - which may be more or less open to interpretation according to 
how it is drafted (more or less restrictive laws). Risk management is, after all, at the core 
of the State and has always been central to its transformations. 
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2.2.2 How climate change becomes conscience in the crucible of complexity 
Presenter: Alfredo Pena-Vega (EHESS, CNRS) 
 
Climate change can be interpreted, according to A. Pena-Vega, as a complex 
system such as Edgar Morin defined it in his « Introduction to Complex Thought » [2]. The 
stakes involved in it are multidimensional, and suppose at once the ideas of 
transformation, uncertainty and unexpectedness, unpredictability and crisis … 
It henceforth seems necessary to arm ourselves with instruments enabling us to 
understand this reality. The common denominator of such instruments is rationality. 
Because climate change involves stakes which are climatological, economic, social and 
health-related, as well as questions of governance, ethics, biodiversity etc. Cross-
disciplinarity appears to be one form of rationality which allows us to avoid the dangers 
of « fear-mongering ». A study was conducted among 12,000 high school students from 
20 different countries, of which the objective was to understand how younger 
generations see climate change. The results are quite varied. If a minority of responders 
question the existence of climate change - with an argument largely based on a social 
construct communicated by the media - 90% of responders claimed to be concerned and 
aware of the negative consequences of climate change. The vast majority consider it to be 
a threat to the survival of humanity, in particular due to the multiplication of natural 
disasters, dwindling biodiversity, the spread of new infectious diseases, notably those 
with vector-borne transmission, and the inequalities it fosters between humans. 
 
2.3 Reflecting on and steering « out of framework » public health crises in a pulverulent 
universe. Presentation and exercise 
Speaker: Patrick Lagadec (International Consultant) 
Moderator: Catherine Leport (Université Paris Diderot - INSERM) 
 
We are currently in the « age of the unthinkable ». Today’s world constantly 
exposes us to new crisis situations which we must learn to confront. These situations are 
all the more difficult to manage in that they most often occur « out of framework», or 
within a framework in which it is difficult to define the outlines delimiting an increasingly 
« volatile » environment. Whereas our benchmarks in terms of crisis management are 
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structured according to typologies (natural/biological/social disaster), the boundaries of 
current crises are unclear, and their typologies intertwined. Unexpected and 
unpredictable, they emerge within a context where uncertainty reigns and where the 
response is organized according to the logic of competitive leadership. Information no 
longer follows a downward flow from the State to the public, but circulates in a 
collaborative manner via widespread connectivity, social networks, which compete with 
institutional media which are sometimes outdated. It is therefore difficult for decision-
makers to circumscribe the areas of operation, to isolate causes, and to distinguish the 
components which permit specific, technical and successive interventions. Good 
judgment thus becomes key. 
Public health crises, and especially those concerning EIDs, have pointed up the difficulties 
in predicting their appearance and development. Comparisons and connections between 
these and other types of crises (natural, technological, industrial …) and how they are 
interpreted can thus prove useful in public health crisis management. 
The unattainable goal of predicting such crises makes it necessary to prepare to 
meet with unexpected events during the ongoing management of the crisis; it is no longer 
a question of predicting the unpredictable, but preparing to deal with it. In the context of 
our intricate, complex society, coordination and communication are of course necessary, 
but it has also become imperative to have a thorough knowledge of the steering process.  
In « out of framework» situations, strategic thinking capability takes precedence over the 
quality of available technical expertise. This can take the form of an « express think-
tank », a group made up of diverse members capable of and trained to work together in 
situations of uncertainty. Whereas in a « classic » situation the command functions is a 
pyramid, in these « out of framework» situations, collaborative and flowing cooperation 
is required, without leadership’s impeding the efficaciousness of the response. In the case 
of Hurricane Sandy in the U.S., in 2003, several work teams were set up in order to handle 
the unprecedented nature of the situation: « real-time innovation », « immediate flaw 
detection », « emergency support functions ». These parallel work teams made it possible 
to optimize management of the disaster by limiting disastrous consequences. It seems 
essential to develop such network-based crisis management in France. 
 
2.4 Interactive session - conditions and factors of emerging infectious agents in humans. 
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Speakers: Maria van Kerkhove (Pasteur Institute, Paris), Allison McGeer (Mount Sinai 
Hospital, Canada), Benoît Guéry (CHRU, Lille) 
Moderators: Jean-Claude Manuguerra (Pasteur Institute, Paris), Patrick Zylberman 
(EHESP) 
 
P. Zylberman recalled to mind the definition of an EID as an unexpected infectious 
- or presumably infectious - phenomenon, affecting humans, animals or both. According 
to the definition used in the High Council of Public Health’s 2011 report [3], this can entail 
an infectious clinical entity which has just appeared (« true » emergence), one previously 
identified (known emergence) or a known infectious disease whose incidence has 
increased or whose characteristics have changed (re-emergence). The HIV epidemic in the 
20th century or the SARS-CoV epidemic in the early 21st century are examples of true 
emergence. The emergence of Hepatitis C corresponds to a known clinical entity whose 
etiological agent was identified at the end of the 1980s. The measles and West Nile virus 
outbreaks on the American continent, in the 19th and end of the 20th centuries 
respectively, are examples of re-emergence.  
Nathan D. Wolfe has defined 5 stages of transformation of an animal pathogen 
into a specifically human pathogen, resulting in a « true » emergence, with the possibility 
of an evolutionary interruption at each stage. Stage 1 corresponds to a situation in which 
a known virus in animals has never yet been detected in humans in natural conditions. In 
Stage 2, the virus known in animals is capable of infecting humans in natural conditions, 
but without the capability of person-to-person transmission. In Stage 3, some cycles of 
secondary person-to-person transmission are possible. In Stage 4, the virus circulates 
among humans through several secondary person-to-person transmission of varying 
duration. Stage 5 is reached when the virus becomes exclusively human, and also 
contagious. 
On a population-wide scale an epidemic goes through four phases: introduction, 
propagation, amplification, and regression of the infectious phenomenon. The 
propagation phase is that during which there are the most widespread and frequent sites 
of infection. It corresponds (particularly for viruses) to the adaptation of the pathogen to 
its new host with person-to-person transmission taking effect little by little. It is often at 
this stage that the epidemic phenomenon is detected, sometimes with a considerable 
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delay relative to the introduction of the pathogen. Propagation can take place not only by 
contiguity but also across vast distances. Humans thus play a role through their activities, 
and are what S. Morse refers to as «microbial traffic engineers» [4]. 
 
What are the major factors in the emergence of new infectious pathogens in 
humans? A great deal of progress has been made in improving the rapidity in identifying 
new viruses, as J.-C. Manuguerra points out. The time delay between the individualization 
of a new infectious nosological entity and the identification of the causal agent thus 
continues to shorten, from 14 years for hepatitis C in the 1970s to 2 years for HIV in 1983, 
and to 6 weeks for SARS in 2003; even less for MERS-CoV. Even so, the discovery or the 
knowledge of the pathogen’s existence does not provide all the answers about the risks 
posed for or by a host species. Various behaviors of pathogens can nonetheless be 
observed, in particular the pathogen’s adaptation may require passing through several 
intermediary host species before adapting to its final host. Moreover, the epidemic 
potential of a discovered virus is difficult to determine. Among the very numerous known 
arboviruses, most are of anecdotal importance for human pathology, and little has been 
undertaken upon their discovery in preparation in case the pathogen were to become 
epidemic. This is true in the case of the Zika virus, first isolated over 50 years ago, and 
currently responsible for a major epidemic in Latin America and in the Caribbean. 
The question of the time lapse between the beginning of an epidemic and identification 
of the pathogen is progressively slipping toward that between the beginning of the 
phenomenon and its detection by the health system. This period appears to be critical for 
eradicating the development of an epidemic. Is it possible to narrow the time gap 
between the beginning of an epidemic and its detection by the healthcare services? 
 
Early identification of an epidemic-level incident mobilizes all health services 
professionals, both in regards to human and to animal health, according to M. Van 
Kerkhove. Human and animal health and the state of ecosystems are inextricably linked, 
and it is believed that nearly 60% of EIDs, including those re-emergent, are of zoonotic 
origin. It is through this exploration of the connections between animals and humans that 
the means of transmission and propagation of MERS-CoV within the human species could 
be revealed. This virus is an example of a potentially epidemic emergence.  
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Schematically, during the MERS-CoV epidemic, a limited number of person-to-person 
transmissions, and sporadic cases between dromedaries and humans, were observed, 
with a certain degree of increase seen in healthcare facilities, sometimes considerable, as 
was the case recently in Korea. During the epidemic 75% of the MERS-CoV cases were 
reported in Saudi Arabia, and of 1600 cases reported to the WHO task force, 60% were 
considered to be primary cases, that is, contracted from an animal host source, and 40% 
to be secondary cases, or acquired through another human case. Every primary case 
represents an opportunity to understand how the infection was contracted. It gradually 
seemed necessary to launch a veterinary investigation as soon as a case was diagnosed. 
This led to the development of animal surveillance, which made it possible to reveal the 
seropositivity of certain dromedaries, as well as active excretion of the virus in their 
environment, which made possible its transmission to humans. This improvement in 
detection of emerging pathogens and early epidemic detection calls for the improvement 
as well of the veterinary surveillance network, the so-called OneHealth approach. In an 
area with limited resources, where all animals cannot be tested, it is imperative to 
concentrate on those areas with high concentrations of animals, such as slaughterhouses, 
and on areas in which humans come into close contact with animals and thus represent a 
high risk of transmission (see conference by P. Daszak). The data collected in these areas 
of frequent contact between humans and animals can be utilized to issue 
recommendations for at-risk populations in order to reduce transmission. Once the virus 
has acquired person-to-person transmission capability, its control is far more complex 
due to the rapidity of propagation following its introduction into the population. It 
therefore becomes difficult for the healthcare system to improve detection of the 
epidemic. Establishing health policies to optimize the case reporting system is thus 
critical. 
 
How to provide care to patients in the case of new EIDs? In an epidemic situation, 
the treatment of affected patients usually is secondary to the need to control the disease, 
as A. McGeer stated. Nevertheless, an adapted patient care procedure can change the 
evolution of an epidemic, to varying degrees according to the pre-existing healthcare 
infrastructure in the given country.  
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In North America, where the services for the monitoring and managing of infectious 
diseases and public health are separated from the healthcare system, the organization of 
care for infected patients is usually left to the physicians. The healthcare system is in fact 
organized around individual patient care, and not oriented toward an approach of global 
individual and collective care providing. In the case of EIDs, care of affected patients 
becomes a political issue in a country graced with a public health system. Health is seen 
as a human right, and governments are judged not only by their ability to prevent and 
manage epidemics, but also according to their management of care provided to ill 
patients. The role of the public healthcare system is therefore to advise physicians and to 
develop recommendations for the detection of cases and their homogeneous treatment. 
These guiding principles make the physicians the kingpins between healthcare structures 
and the treatment of patients, and the public healthcare system. Better patient care 
provision thus improves epidemic response. In fact, treating ill subjects also allows the 
risk of person-to-person transmission and propagation to be reduced. 
This treatment role attributed to physicians can be variously interpreted in countries in 
which the healthcare and public health system are underdeveloped or lacking. In fact, the 
arrival of healthcare personnel and the setting up of precautionary measures required to 
contain the epidemic may be experienced as an intrusion. The lack of comprehension and 
communication between medical staff and the affected community, as well as the 
potential lack of comprehension of the measures set in place can prompt affected 
individuals to hide, due to the uncertainty of their fate. This was the case for example in 
West Africa during the Ebola virus epidemic, during which affected patients were 
sometimes hospitalized far from their villages without care being taken to inform their 
families of their clinical progress and outcome. This led to sometimes-violent rejection of 
the healthcare personnel, which interfered with the measures meant to control the 
epidemic.  
Another element to take into consideration in the care of affected patients is 
protection of the healthcare personnel, which has become a recurring problem. Most of 
the microbial forms with epidemic potential propagate within the community. For a long 
time hospitals were not troubled over the risk of nosocomial transmission of EID agents. 
Care providers were not aware at the time of the risk of contagion that they themselves 
ran when providing care to patients. This awareness happened during the recent SARS, 
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MERS-CoV and Ebola epidemics, which shared certain physio-pathological characteristics 
different from those involved in previous epidemics. In fact the peak of virus excretion for 
measles, chicken pox and influenza generally occur before or upon the appearance of 
symptoms, and the risk of transmission is virtually nil when the patient arrives at hospital. 
SARS, MERS-CoV and Ebola virus have a different viral excretion rhythm: symptoms 
appear with a weak viral load, and their intensity increases with the level of viral 
excretion, which reaches its maximum just when the patient requires the most care. The 
hospital thus becomes a center for the propagation of the pathogen. The hospital system 
is therefore in danger of breakdown, as it is both the pole for patient care and the new 
center of the infection’s transmission.  
These new pathogens therefore require a re-thinking of hospital design, in order to 
optimize both control of epidemics and patient care. 
 
What has been, or is, the extent of nosocomial infection’s role in the transmission 
of SARS-CoV and MERS-CoV? The new pathogens require us to re-evaluate modes of 
prevention for nosocomial transmission, confirmed B. Guéry. The 2003 SARS-CoV 
epidemic serves as a good example of what was learned about the intra-hospital 
transmission of these new pathogens. Person-to-person transmission of SARS occurs 
through droplets, physical contacts and airborne pathways. The SARS-CoV transmission 
rate to healthcare providers exclusive of invasive procedures has been estimated at 21%. 
The main risk factor identified was the lack of protection of the provider’s airway through 
wearing a mask, with an odds-ratio estimated at 13 (3-60). Wearing scrubs and 
handwashing were also associated with lower transmission risk. 
SARS is a disease which appeared in 2003 in Guangdong Province in China, then in Hong 
Kong, where numerous primary and secondary cases occurred. In total, according to the 
case index, 716 secondary and tertiary cases occurred, of which 52.3% among healthcare 
providers. Beyond standard hygiene measures, studies conducted on affected healthcare 
providers revealed that certain categories of personnel, such as technicians and nurse’s 
aids, show an infection rate twice that of the nursing staff, and 6 times greater than the 
medical personnel. These studies made it possible to identify infection risk factors 
generally not taken into account in the fight against nosocomial transmission of 
pathogens: a significantly, greatly increased risk (odds-ratio 7.3) was noted in care 
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providers having used precautionary measures against SARS transmission for less than 2 
hours, as was the case with those not having understood the protective measures (odds-
ratio 3.1).  
The factors identified as influencing transmission are patient viral load and patient 
index distance. The ideal conditions for transmission to occur are those of an infected 
patient excreting large quantities of virus, presenting with a certain number of co-
morbidities capable of masking the initial profile, and the existence of multiple close 
contacts with high-risk procedures such as oro-tracheal intubation, performing a 
fibroscopy, or the administration of treatments through nebulizers. The idea of a « super-
excreter » patient was also identified during recent respiratory virus epidemics. This 
concept could play a crucial role. Usually it concerns cases of very serious infection 
occurring in patients with several co-morbidities.  
In Beijing in 2003, the SARS case index was also associated with a large number of 
secondary cases (76 cases, of which 12 among healthcare personnel). As with MERS-CoV, 
despite a relatively low basal reproduction rate (R0), a large number of care providers 
were infected during the epidemic. This is what happened, for example, in Abu Dhabi, 
where 65 cases of MERS-CoV were diagnosed, of which 42% among healthcare providers. 
Each case of provider infection was followed up through an epidemiological study, and 
each time an obstacle to the isolation of the patient and to the application of hygiene 
practices was noted. Over 80% of the MERS-CoV cases identified in Korea were thus 
traceable to 5 « super-excreter » patients. This notion remains questionable, as it is 
reductionist and could lead to the identification only of patients in this category, to the 
neglect of transmission risks associated with other patients. It is probably more fair to 
speak of « hyper-excretion events » which implies that each patient is at maximum risk, 
and should be treated using precautionary measures. 
 
In conclusion, the intra-hospital control and transmission of EIDs can only occur in 
connection with the development of precautionary standards, which should be ongoing 
over time, and should be applied by all healthcare providers. It is imperative to ensure 
that caregivers are adequately and regularly trained, and that they constantly keep in 
mind the importance of isolation of all infected patients. To achieve this, it is probably 
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necessary to resort to specialized units, in reference hospitals, in conjunction with clear 
decisions at the national level. 
 
3. Synthesis and proposals 
Axis 1: Global health and ecological approach 
An integrated approach to health in face of the globalization of risk has been 
developing over the last few years. The « OneHealth/EcoHealth » concept, or global 
health, takes into account the fact that human health, animal health and environmental 
health are inextricably linked, especially in regards to EIDs, exposure to which is fostered 
by the multiplication of transcontinental travel, many instances of human-animal contact, 
and intensive farming and ranching. Many recent examples have made it possible to 
establish the key role played by animal biodiversity in the introduction and transmission 
of pathogens within human populations. Whether it be the role of bats in the 2014 Ebola 
virus epidemic, or dromedaries in the 2012 MERS-CoV epidemic, the crucial role of 
animals and of human-animal contact - being wild or domestical animals - in triggering an 
epidemic has recently been emphasized. Primates, rodents and bats are the three 
mammal groups most likely to be at the origin of future pandemics due to the high 
proportion of viruses which they share with humans. The inclusion of fields which appear 
quite unrelated (infectious diseases, animal health and ecological and environmental 
sciences) should thus be pursued and improved.  
It has been possible to establish models which allow the prediction of emergence 
tendencies in infectious diseases, and certain geographical areas at high risk for 
emergence have been identified: Central Africa and West Africa, Southeast Asia, Central 
America. These areas correspond to those at high risk of propagation due to 
underdeveloped or deficient public health systems, and to the absence of epidemiological 
surveillance. Tools necessary for effective prevention of future epidemics are now 
available. These are all the more critical in that recent increasing tendencies raise fears of 
a multiplication of the number of emergent epidemics in future. Beyond the fight against 
pathogen propagation, its introduction into the human population is in fact a key step 
against which « battle plans » can be drawn up. 
In order to perfect pandemic response, it is necessary to improve the coordination 
and interconnection between individual and institutional participants, such as healthcare 
Page 23 sur 27 
providers and public health systems. A global response approach (OneResponse) should 
be reflected upon and developed. On an institutional level, a first step in bringing 
together the fields of environment and animal health occurred in 2010 in France with the 
creation of a national French Agency for Food, Environmental and Occupational Health & 
Safety (ANSES), originating in the French Agency for Food Safety (AFSSA, which also 
includes the National Agency for Veterinary Drugs) and the French Agency for 
Environmental and Occupational Health & Safety (AFSSET). Another case of bringing 
together the areas of surveillance, prevention and human health intervention occurred in 
2016 with the creation of the French Public Health Agency, with the merger of the Health 
Surveillance Institute (InVS), the National Institute for Prevention and Health Education 
(INPES), and the Organization for Preparedness and Response to Health Emergencies 
(EPRUS). The relations between these two new institutions should be developed in order 
to provide a better-coordinated response to future health crises.  
 
Axis 2: Preventing and anticipating epidemic propagation 
  The response to an EID should take into account not only factors linked to EIDs, 
but also to a constellation of political, economic and socio-cultural constraints. The 
decision to put in place such a battle is in fact a political decision which involves, beyond 
the scientific aspects, the intervention’s impact upon the popularity of the acting political 
powers-that-be. If governments are judged according to their ability to prevent epidemic 
crises, they are equally judged on their ability to avoid expenditures deemed excessive 
given the existing risk. These political considerations can run counter to the scientific 
rationale behind the response. This is how, in the case of the 2014 Ebola virus epidemic, 
the United States became involved: through the declaration by the Liberian President on 
August 6, 2014, on the threat to national security posed by Ebola, and the danger of the 
spread of the epidemic to the U.S. soil. In parallel with vaccine research and 
development, the actions of the U.S., the WHO and the United Nations have focused on 
treatment of infected patients and the epidemiological securing of burials. In addition, 
despite a sometimes limited human impact, the economic impact of epidemics involving 
indirect costs (consequence for certain sectors of activity) has shown a marked increase. 
However, what characterizes modern epidemics is the duration of the economic 
« shock », in that it is temporary, as opposed to previous epidemics during which the 
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shock tended to be drawn out in particular due to the persistence of infectious sources. 
There are many examples of this: among others, the « Spanish influenza » of 1918, the 
effects of which (company closures, loss of revenue) faded out in 1921, or, more recently, 
the SARS-CoV epidemic, when the recession, that had been triggered by alerts against 
travel to Southeast Asian destinations communicated in March, ceased once these alerts 
were lifted two or three months later. It is of note that during the SARS-CoV epidemic 
only certain sectors (especially tourism) were affected in Asia and in Ontario, Canada, and 
not the entire global economy. 
Carrying out preventive measures such as staff training makes it possible to limit the 
number of crises at a lower cost. The cost-effectiveness of such an approach has already 
been shown. It is henceforth necessary to raise awareness in decision-makers of the 
importance of prevention relative to risk.  
Beyond these constraints, the decision to intervene is complicated by the 
heterogeneous nature of potential epidemics of the different pathogens. For this reason, 
and given the absence of technology permitting the prediction of the epidemic potential 
of a pathogen, prevention which targets the agent is impossible. Prevention must 
therefore adopt other means, such as training locals in order to improve hygiene 
conditions. The improvement of transversal knowledge on infectious agents’ transmission 
carries particular importance for the goal of preventing emergence. 
Once an emerging agent is introduced into the human population, the pathogen 
propagation phase within the human population is the key phase in the development of 
the epidemic, and the one during which it is still possible to act in order to prevent the 
amplification of the pathogen in the population. The beginning of the propagation phase 
can be difficult to identify, and improvement in diagnostic techniques as well as the 
development of rapid diagnostic tests, and even on the field, makes it possible to 
accelerate detection of an epidemic signal. Moreover, given the key role of certain animal 
species in the development of new epidemics, the development of animal health 
surveillance would allow us to further shorten the time lapse between the introduction of 
the pathogen and its propagation; however, this poses significant problems of wild animal 
monitoring particularly in Southern Hemisphere countries. 
 
Axis 3: Risk and crisis governance in relation to EIDs 
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Better knowledge of States’ operational modes in dealing with risk makes it 
possible to better understand their interventions and to better adapt the scientific 
response. The notion of risk has, little by little, become political, and the State uses risk to 
govern. Risk management is therefore at the very heart of the State. Recent public health 
crises have led to risk’s taking on a new form, that of the unknown, by the fact of the 
unpredictability of its appearance and evolution. An interaction between scientific and 
political approaches to risk is absolutely necessary, in order to better evaluate at-risk 
situations according to modern methods such as structured decision-making, and to 
better handle risk-management tools. The changing nature of risks calls for the 
emergence of a new form of governance, which puts the individual back into the center 
of the State’s action, as well as the confronting of arguments with expert committees. 
Civil society’s participation in risk management should be developed, and observation 
should once again play its part in crisis response. Younger generations might also take 
greater part in responding to current crises. 
 
Priority proposals in a nutchell 
Seven priority proposals can be outlined as follows: 
 Encourage research on the prediction, screening and early detection of new risks 
of infection 
 Develop research and surveillance concerning transmission of pathogens between 
animals and humans, with their reinforcement in particular in intertropical areas 
(« hot spots ») thanks to public support 
 Pursue aid development and support in these areas of prevention and training for 
local health personnel, and to foster risk awareness in the population 
 Ensure adapted patient care in order to promote adherence to treatment and to 
epidemic propagation reduction measures 
 Develop greater sensitization and training among politicians and healthcare 
providers, in order to better prepare them to respond to new types of crises 
 Modify the logic of governance, drawing from all available modes of 
communication and incorporating new information-sharing tools 
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 Develop economic research on the fight against EIDs, taking into account specific 
determining factors in order to create a balance between preventive and 
treatment approaches. 
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